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Abstract 
In this paper, I draw on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to consider the notion of 
perversion and fetishisation within the context of contemporary UK public mental health services 
which have been subject to New Public Management (NPM) restructuring. Offering an organizational 
case example based on clinical experience within an expanded NHS mental health service, I explore 
how services that are subject to neo-liberal regulatory and performance management systems 
sponsor a perverse organizational solution to the anxieties and difficulties of dealing with 
psychologically distressed patients. I conclude that theorizing the unconscious dynamics of 
perversion and fetishism may provide an opportunity to rethink governmentality, offering a 
potentially fruitful means of addressing recent political concerns about the negative impact of a 
‘target culture’ on public sector health services. 
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Introduction 
A middle-aged woman came to see me for psychotherapy in an NHS mental health service a few 
months ago. When she arrived, she was asked by the receptionist at the front desk to complete a 
number of routine questionnaires that were now required by the service before the start of our 
appointment. These questionnaires included brief, standardised self-report measures of her mood 
over the last week; her employment status; and a rating scale of how her difficulties were impacting 
on her ability to manage at home and in her close relationships.  My patient duly completed the 
various forms and handed them to me when I came to collect her for our appointment. When we 
arrived at my consulting room, she not unreasonably asked why she had to answer all these 
questions. I replied that the service was required to demonstrate weekly outcomes to the 
government in order to continue being funded. After a pause, my patient said, somewhat dryly, that 
she didn’t really think that the ‘outcomes’ on the form were the outcomes she was interested in -  
and would I mind if she didn’t fill in the forms? ‘Not at all’ I replied, putting them down on the table. 
‘Actually’ she said after a pause, now looking at me sideways with a smile, rather like a naughty 
child, ‘I don’t want to make trouble. Let’s have them there - but not really.  I’ll fill in my name and the 
date, but I won’t fill in the rest. I’ll give you blank forms to keep on file –and at least that’ll keep the 
government happy’. We both laughed heartily at this, and thereafter each week she solemnly 
handed me a blank form, index of her unwillingness to comply with service governance 
requirements. 
When I raised the matter at a subsequent clinical supervision group, there was some disagreement 
about the best way to deal with this rather delightful piece of what is often referred to, in the 
psychoanalytic field, as ‘acting out’.  One colleague thought that if my patient wasn’t willing to 
complete the questionnaires then she shouldn’t be offered psychotherapy.  Another thought I was 
secretly colluding with the patient’s lack of co-operation.  A third argued heatedly that, as we all 
‘knew’ the scores were irrelevant to understanding our patients, it was perfectly reasonable for my 
patient to refuse to comply. Indeed, after a while, the discussion turned into a more general debate 
about the nature of the service and the recent imposition by management of what many felt were 
therapeutically intrusive and clinically inappropriate outcome measures on those referred to the 
service. Finally, perhaps in response to what was fast becoming a rather fractious mood in the 
group, the supervisor intervened to suggest that, as the funding of the service was now 
unfortunately dependent on receiving data from our patients, perhaps I should consider completing 
the scores myself on the basis of how I felt my patient was progressing.   
I later found myself rather thoughtful about this notion of things being ‘there…but not really’.  For it 
seemed to me that our group, my patient and the supervisor were all part of a system that had 
recruited us into a very particular position in relation to reality: one in which we were being asked to 
subscribe to something whilst at the same time undermining it. This mental feat clearly involved 
everyone in an act of disavowal which in this case entailed the acceptance of something – in this 
case, the requirement for clinical outcome measures - being ‘there…..but not really’:  we had been 
conscripted, it seemed, into what might be termed a lying relationship to reality. Indeed, the 
outburst of wry laughter in the group following our supervisor’s suggestion was, I think, testament 
to our recognition of precisely this perverse position we found ourselves adopting as clinicians.  
The psychoanalytic term perversion has been used in many different ways. It was originally 
identified by Freud (1927) in the rather narrow context of the sexual perversions or fetishism, but in 
subsequent literature has been regarded either as a solution to developmental conflict (eg. Stoller, 
1986; Khan, 1987) or as a disavowal of castration and lack (Lacan and Granoff, 1956).  It has since 
been accorded a wider significance in the psychosocial and organizational literature, which has 
attempted to illuminate how systemic failures within institutions (Long, 2009) and perverse social 
defences (Hoggett, 2010; Rizq, 2012a) disavow and undermine the work of an organization.  Building 
on the rich tradition of psychoanalytic theorizing about organizations (Jaques, 1952; Menzies-Lyth, 
1960; Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Miller 1976), and following recent papers theorising unconscious 
organizational dynamics (Rizq, 2011; 2012a,b; Rizq 2013a,b), I want to consider notions of 
perversion and fetishization within the context of contemporary UK public mental health services 
which have been subject to New Public Management (NPM) restructuring since the 1980s. Indeed, 
deployment of NPM strategies in the work of teachers, police officers, doctors and social workers 
has been evident for some time where rationalist philosophies of transparency, effectiveness and 
accountability prevail, resulting in an audit culture pervading all levels of the organization.  
Recent scandals, however, suggest that a ‘tick-box culture’ characteristic of these NPM strategies lies 
at the heart of serious problems within the NHS, including failings at the Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust, abuse at Winterbourne View Hospital and the deaths of ‘Baby P’ and Victoria 
Climbie to mention only a few recent high-profile examples. These were all cases where attention to 
government targets, clinical outcomes and paperwork took precedence over what Ballatt and 
Campling (2011) call ‘intelligent kindness’, resulting in perverse organizational dynamics that 
ultimately led to terrible suffering and unnecessary deaths.  
In bringing a psychoanalytic sensibility to the study of organizations, Gabriel and Carr (2002) suggest 
that it ‘opens valuable windows into the world of organisations and management, offering insights 
that are startlingly original, have extensive explanatory powers and can find ample practical 
implementations’ (p. 348). In this paper, then, I want to use a psychoanalytic lens to illuminate how 
mental health services that are subject to neo-liberal regulatory and performance management 
systems sponsor a perverse organizational solution to the anxieties and difficulties of dealing with 
psychologically distressed patients. I will first offer a brief theoretical outline of psychoanalytic views 
of perversion and fetishism, drawing on Freud and Lacan, before suggesting that the current 
marketization of the NHS and the pressure on staff and managers to conform to ever-increasing 
clinical governance requirements both result from and defend against anxieties aroused by contact 
with those in psychological distress.  Drawing on my clinical and supervisory work in an NHS mental 
health service, I then offer a case vignette to illustrate how perverse dynamics percolate throughout 
an organization in ways that undermine the very care these services set out to provide.   
Psychoanalytic views of perversion and fetishism.  
In his early essay ‘Fetishism’, Freud (1927) argues that the little boy is unable to accept the fact that 
a woman has no penis. Using the term ‘Verleugnung’, he proposes that an unconscious process of 
disavowal takes place whereby the child is able both to know and to not-know about this absence at 
one and the same time: 
 ‘It is not true that, after the child has made his observation of the woman, he has preserved 
unaltered his belief that woman have a phallus. He has retained that belief, but he has also given it 
up’ (p.154).  
Freud’s early example points to the significance of the individual’s relationship to absence - a loss 
that is disavowed with consequent implications for the possibility of its symbolic representation. 
Thus for Freud, the disavowal of loss is seen as a central obstacle to the construction of inner psychic 
reality. Indeed, the trauma of the loss is what can trigger fetishism, where the fetish object – the 
shoe, the silk dress - becomes the symbolic substitute for the mother’s missing penis. It masks a gap 
or an absence that cannot be symbolised. 
Whilst Freud sees perversion and fetishism largely as a process of sexual substitution that results in 
aberrant sexual behaviour, Lacan weaves the notion of disavowal into a more complex theoretical 
account of personality structure in which a constitutive lack or fragmentation at the heart of 
subjectivity is perceived as fundamental. In Lacan’s (1949) ‘mirror stage’, his template for the 
Imaginary order, the child’s primordial anxiety is seen as a response to its lack of physical coherence 
and motor co-ordination. Identification with his or her mirror image thus confers a subjective feeling 
of wholeness, completeness and self-mastery, allowing the child triumphantly to assume a 
narcissistic ideal, an anticipated sense of self-unity and control that it does not yet possess.  By 
contrast, the Symbolic order is represented by the Law of the Father, a symbolic Father and symbolic 
phallus that fulfil a function independent of the existence or behaviour of the actual flesh and blood 
father and his penis. The symbolic Father imposes the Law and regulates desire in the Oedipal 
configuration of mother and child.  It is acceptance of the Law of the Father - ie. acceding to 
castration or lack -  that separates the child from an Imaginary identification with the desire of the 
mother and precipitates him or her into the Symbolic order where the child comes to understand his 
relation to others within the larger socio-symbolic system of language, rules, gender differences and 
cultural ideals. However, whilst repression and foreclosure are the fundamental operations by which 
the neurotic and the psychotic respectively manage their knowledge of lack,  Lacan sees disavowal 
as the main mechanism by which the pervert relates to his or her knowledge of castration: by 
simultaneously denying and recognizing it.  
What is disavowed here, according to Lacan (1962), is the notion that lack causes desire. The 
perverse individual constitutes himself as the subject that plugs up the desire in the (m)Other so that 
there can be no lack and no castration. However, this process of disavowal paradoxically engenders 
intense anxiety:  
‘What provokes anxiety? Contrary to what people say, it is neither the rhythm nor the alternation of 
the mothers’ presence-absence. What proves this is that the child indulges in repeating presence-
absence games: security of presence is found in the possibility of absence. What is most anxiety-
producing for the child is when the relationship through which he comes to be – on the basis of lack 
which makes him desire – is most perturbed: when there is no possibility of lack, when his mother is 
constantly on his back’ (Seminar X, 1962). 
Lacan and Granoff’s  (1956) reworking of Freud’s (1927) original paper suggests that fetishism occurs 
when these anxieties are transferred to the social images and ideals of the Symbolic order, in 
particular, the Name of the Father or his representatives such as the state, the government, the 
police, or the law. For this reason perversion – or fetishism - always involves an attempt to buttress 
the paternal function, to bring the Law into being so that the anxiety-relieving separation from the 
(m)Other can occur. Indeed, Lacan writes perversion as ‘pere-version’, to emphasise the way in 
which the pervert appeals to the father, trying to make the symbolic Other exist via the perverse act: 
[T]he perversion (that is, the fetish) serves to multiply the force of the father’s symbolic action 
(putting the mOther’s lack into words), to supplement or prop up the paternal function. The name 
given by the father is a start, a first step, but does not go far enough. It needs support, it needs  
amplification (Fink, 1997, p. 183).  
In perversion then, there is a staging of the Law; an attempt to bring the Law into being. However, 
Lacan argues that the fetish object can never be fully functioning: the subject can never entirely ‘be’ 
the longed-for symbolic phallus. This is because the order of the Real, the realm of that which 
cannot be symbolized, ensures there is always a lack which escapes the subject and therefore the 
symbolic Other.  It is this lack that engenders the subject’s ceaseless search for the lost jouissance of 
unity with the (m)Other and ensures the perpetuation of desire.  
Perversion and anxiety. 
Understanding the organizational dynamics operating in the context of care for the mentally ill 
involves recognising how Western society has historically viewed, defined and treated those deemed 
to be ‘mad’. Foucault’s (1972) notion of mental disorder as a social construction in the service of 
exclusion and social control is often conveniently forgotten in the contemporary drive to label, treat 
and cure the mentally ill. Indeed, the transformation of what was once a space of exclusion into a 
medical space is what, according to Foucault, enabled mental illness to become the object of 
scientific observation and experimentation. Currently, the so-called scientific basis of psychological 
treatment takes for granted the object that it has, in fact, itself constructed. The uncritical 
acceptance of this assumption is central to current mental health policies whose implementation 
depends on psychiatric diagnoses that are presumed to index preferred forms of government-
approved therapeutic and pharmacological treatments. Foucault reminds us that: 
 ‘The positivist psychiatry of the nineteenth century, like our own……secretly inherited the relationship 
that classical culture as a whole had set up with unreason. They were modified and displaced, and it 
was thought that madness was being studied from the point of view of an objective pathology; but 
despite those good intentions, madness was still haunted by an ethical view of unreason, and the 
scandal of its animal nature’ (1972/2006, p. 159).  
I want to suggest that public sector organizations offering psychological care are still subject to this 
‘secret inheritance’; still haunted by the fear of ‘unreason’ and the mentally ill’s ‘animal nature’. 
Indeed, the psychosocial literature, drawing on Kleinian psychoanalytic theory and Menzies-Lyth’s 
(1960) view of social defences against anxiety is one that draws on precisely this view by suggesting 
that institutions develop strategies and defences designed to protect staff from the emotional 
difficulties aroused by contact with vulnerability, illness and death.  The difficulties, stresses and 
strains of working with those deemed to be mentally ill have also been documented in an extensive 
clinical literature, usually incorporating psychoanalytic concepts such as splitting, projection, and 
projective identification to understand the often paradoxical ways in which organizations aiming to 
help those in distress fail to help those most in need of their care (eg Cooper and Lousada, 2005; 
Main, 1957; Obholzer, 2003; Scanlon and Adlam, 2011).  
From a Lacanian perspective, however, anxiety is not simply an affect subject to repression: anxiety 
is rather something that arises when subject is confronted with the ineluctable fragmentation and 
instability of the self (Lacan, 1962). The Imaginary nature of the self’s sense of unity and identity is 
disrupted by any reminder of its constitutive lack of cohesion, which would result in a confrontation 
with the traumatic Real. It is this that sponsors an anxiety that can never be contained or dissipated, 
although the gap between the illusory ego and the alienated subject may be temporarily filled with 
language, forming the basis of social projects unconsciously designed to recapture a lost fantasy of 
unity and wholeness.   The mentally ill, then, whose vulnerability and dependence confront us with a 
fragmentation that is the basis of a shared humanity, may be said to arouse particular anxieties in 
society which governments and welfare institutions are tasked with managing. In line with Foucault, 
MacCallum (2002) and Peternelj-Taylor (2004) have referred to a process of ‘othering’  by which 
means we establish clear boundaries between those who are ‘normal’ and those who are deemed to 
be different, damaged or deformed (Shildrick, 2002).  In this way, I suggest, mental health services 
unconsciously operate to organize and sustain an Imaginary sense of unity and ‘normality’ within 
society, keeping painful subjective reminders of lack and division at bay.   
Following Long (2009) and Hoggett (2010), I now want to suggest that the current marketization of 
the NHS, the fragmentation and privatization of its services and the pressure on staff and managers 
to conform to ever-increasing clinical governance requirements both result from and are the 
consequence of  anxieties aroused by contact with those in psychological distress. I propose the 
emergence of a perverse organizational solution, where these anxieties are concealed and 
disavowed beneath a fetishized ‘target culture’ which offers an idealized picture of the work of a 
mental health service whilst simultaneously undermining and subverting the very care that it is 
mandated by government to provide.  In order to develop my thesis, I want to draw on recent 
developments in public sector mental health services where the UK government’s Improving Access 
to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme has resulted in extensive changes to the way in which 
mental health services are now commissioned, organized, implemented and evaluated. Initiated by 
the Layard (2006) Depression Report which made a robust economic case for the improved provision 
of psychological therapies, the IAPT programme promised savings for the Department of Work and 
Pensions by reducing the cost of incapacity benefit for those unable to work because of depression 
and anxiety. Following an initial investment of £3.7 million funding to launch the programme, the 
Department of Health Spending Review 2010 subsequently included around £433million for 
psychological therapies over the period to April 2015. The current UK Coalition Government has 
signalled continued support for the IAPT programme, with planned expansion of services to include 
children and young people, those with physical health long-term conditions, medically unexplained 
symptoms and those with severe mental illness.  
A key feature of IAPT and one which defines it clearly as a mental health programme exemplifying 
the NPM ideals of transparency, accountability and governance is the requirement for clinical staff 
to record multiple clinical outcome measures on a computer software system. Staff are closely 
monitored to ensure they record every contact with patients and evaluate clinical progress 
according the full IAPT dataset.  This is used to inform local and national reporting, to demonstrate 
adherence to ‘best practice’ guidelines  and to justify the use of what are deemed to be ‘evidence-
based’ approaches to psychological therapy recommended by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE).   
The following case example, based on a period of work as a senior psychologist and clinical 
supervisor within a Primary Care IAPT service, is intended to be illustrative of the complex 
intersection between unconscious perverse dynamics, staff behaviour and the specific regulatory 
procedures to which both I and my colleagues were subject.  
Organizational case example.  
The IAPT programme, incorporating the ‘stepped care’ approach advocated by the NICE guidelines, 
has introduced large numbers of newly trained junior mental health workers into the NHS 
(Psychological Wellbeing advisors, or PWPs)  offering both ‘low-intensity’ guided self-help, 
computerised cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), psycho-education and signposting to voluntary 
sector services alongside ‘high-intensity’ face-to-face therapeutic work, based mainly on cognitive-
behavioural principles.  
This particular Primary Care service went through a long period of upheaval and change. For over 
two years, due to the planned restructuring of all services within the NHS, including the abolition of 
Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts, it was decided that the service and its staff 
should be re-employed by a local NHS Mental Health Trust. During this period, managers of the 
service were under increasing pressure to demonstrate compliance with activity targets and 
recovery rates in the service in order to establish the viability and legitimacy of the service to its 
prospective employers. As part of the validation process, the most junior staff in the service, the 
PWPs, came under renewed pressure to increase their caseloads to meet the expected number of 
5000 referrals a year. However, during this time, a number of these junior staff made a decision to 
leave after only a very short time in the service and it became apparent to managers in the service 
that these young and in many cases very inexperienced staff were finding the demands of high 
volume, high turnover clinical work very challenging. There was concern that the planned handover 
to the Mental Health Trust would be placed in jeopardy due to the loss of staff and the resulting 
reduced activity levels in the service. 
For some years previously, a system of monthly support groups or ‘reflective practice’ groups had 
been in place, facilitated by senior counsellors and psychotherapists in the service. They had been 
set up in order to provide a space where PWPs could reflect on and discuss salient professional and 
personal issues arising from their clinical work. The groups had been set up and ran on a voluntary 
basis with staff attending by agreement unless they had unavoidable clinical commitments. Over 
time, they had become a regular part of the service. As a senior psychologist and psychotherapist in 
the service, I was asked to offer individual supervision to the counsellors who facilitated these 
groups. Over a period of two or three years, it had become clear to me that the counsellors felt 
these groups served an important function in the service. They seemed to enable the PWPs to share 
difficulties, particularly those arising from some of the more complex cases in which they frequently 
found themselves involved. It was also clear that the groups served as a safety valve for the venting 
of complaints and grumbles usually relating to the increasing demands on their caseloads, the lack of 
time permitted for joint clinical discussion, the problems associated with individual caseload 
management, and the reluctance on the part of management to consider their training and 
development needs.  
During one supervision session recently, a counsellor told me that a letter of complaint about a PWP 
had recently been received by the Head of the service. This young PWP had been shown the letter 
which she had brought and read out to the group. It was clear, my supervisee said, that the client 
who had made the complaint was very angry and upset. She had been seeking counselling from the 
service to help support her with a profoundly disabled child, and, following her referral, had received 
the offer of a telephone consultation to discuss the problem. However, in her letter, the patient had 
complained about the way this PWP had handled the discussion: by telephoning her when she had 
expected a ‘proper’ face-to-face’ appointment; by asking her to complete a number of what she felt 
were irrelevant questionnaires over the telephone; by telling her that, if she was unwilling to 
complete these questionnaires, she would be unable to access the service at all; and finally, by 
offering to refer her on to a voluntary sector service when she had specifically asked for NHS 
counselling. In the letter, the patient wrote: ‘I felt utterly uncared for, I was treated like a number’, 
and went on to say that she was shocked that an NHS service could dismiss her legitimate needs in 
such a way.   
My supervisee went on to explain that the PWP, for her part, had clearly felt guilty and defensive.  In 
explaining the case to the group, she made it clear that she had treated this very depressed and 
anxious client with great care and courtesy, and that she had carefully followed all the relevant 
protocols for a telephone assessment. What else was she supposed to do? She felt that she had 
done everything she could – including the onward referral of the patient to a service that could offer 
her respite care for her disabled child. ‘I didn’t come here to be complained about’, she said rather 
tearfully to the group, ‘I can’t care for everybody!’ At this point, group members who had initially 
tried to help their colleague think about how else she might have dealt with the situation all rallied 
round, agreeing that she had certainly done everything she could reasonably do in the 
circumstances; indeed, they reasoned, given the numbers of people on their caseloads, of course 
she wasn’t able to care for everybody. There seemed to be, my supervisee said, a growing anxiety 
and indignation in the group about this accusation from a patient of being ‘utterly uncared for’, as if 
group members felt that following the correct procedure, doing everything ‘right’, should be 
sufficient. It was as if, he said rather worriedly, ‘there’s no need actually to care; the policies and 
protocols will do the work instead’. When my supervisee invited the group to think more closely 
about what this undoubtedly very angry patient had wanted from their colleague, he was met with 
much protest about the impossibility of managing the intense emotional demands of such ‘fragile’ 
patients, about the lack of training provided for coping with ‘difficult’ members of the public and 
about the many other patients that remained on caseloads awaiting attention. It was clear that the 
complaint had created enormous anxieties for the group and that their ability to think about the 
feelings generated by such an event was limited.   
Two weeks later, the Head of the service sent an email round to all staff announcing that the 
reflective practice groups were to become compulsory. No explanation was given for this blanket 
directive and no link was made with the previous complaint. As supervisor, I was summoned by the 
clinical lead and asked to ensure that each facilitator kept a group attendance register and notes on 
what was discussed each session. I too would be required to keep a supervision register and notes 
on what was discussed with each of my supervisees.   When I queried the necessity to undertake the 
additional work and administration involved, I was rather briskly told that the service needed to 
ensure it was ‘covered in case of complaints’ and so, along with all other aspects of the service, what 
took place within the reflective practice groups should be recorded and kept on file. This would 
demonstrate ‘good practice’ and ‘transparency’ in line with what the service’s prospective 
employers expected.  In subsequently discussing these procedural changes with the counsellors, it 
was clear that we all uncomfortable and worried about the change from what had hitherto been a 
fairly relaxed and informal setting, a space that was free of impingement by management, to yet 
another bureaucratized space, one that was being watched and reported on.  
Over the next few months, the few PWPs who had not so far shown an interest in attending the 
groups were now required by their managers to participate. Some of these individuals were initially 
unwilling to come and several counsellors noticed that this changed the atmosphere of the groups 
from one of enthusiasm, goodwill and interest into one that was, for a time at least, characterised by 
a degree of covert resistance.  I now started to hear from my supervisee how he struggled to 
manage some of the PWPs who expressed impatience with having to make time to attend when 
they had so many assessments to undertake. Over time, however, these difficulties seemed to 
recede and I became increasingly aware of a more subtle shift in the work he reported. For example, 
I heard less about the PWP’s difficulties, mistakes and problems and more about examples of clinical 
work that group members felt had been particularly innovative or successful. Others in turn started 
to discuss administrative matters and to provide detailed examples of how they had managed to find 
short-cuts on the computer system that enabled them to input activity data and clinical outcomes 
more efficiently. My supervisee, relieved to find these discussions reviving what he had felt had 
been the group’s flagging interest, recounted with satisfaction several occasions where, spurred on 
by their colleagues, group members appeared to ‘compete’ with eachother in offering accounts of 
how they had successfully managed ‘tricky’ patients or manoeuvred the system to their advantage in 
different ways. Grumbles and complaints in the group seemed to reduce, and I now heard how the 
group was rather ambitiously extolling the virtues of ‘best practice’ and their successful use of an 
‘evidence-base’ in their work. Members were keen to talk about how well the service was faring 
relative to other services in the locality, and were excited at the planned recruitment of new staff to 
replace those who had left. Over time, my supervisee started to joke that the group didn’t really 
seem to need him anymore, and that it could perhaps ‘run by itself now’.  
It was during this period of time that I found myself uncharacteristically seized with a sudden 
sleepiness during our supervision sessions. My supervisee and I met in the afternoons, and for 
several weeks I told myself it was a post-lunch dip in my metabolism. Much as I tried to rationalise it, 
it quickly became clear to me that I was not able to pay proper attention to what he was saying. I felt 
tired, muzzy and overpoweringly drowsy and on several occasions I even had to ask him to repeat 
what he had said. I became increasingly concerned – and ashamed - about what I felt was my lack of 
interest in the supervision and redoubled my attempts to demonstrate attention and interest. 
However, it was not until he unprecedentedly failed to attend a session, ostensibly because he had 
forgotten to put the date in his diary, that matters came to a head.  On finding him absent at the 
usual time, I sent a text asking where he was: I received a profuse apology and we arranged to meet 
a week or so later.  When I asked my colleague about what had happened, I found, to my surprise, 
that he was unwilling to discuss our missed session, reiterating that it was simply a timetabling 
mistake and ‘wasn’t important’. At the end of the session, however, he asked, in an offhand sort of 
way, whether I intended to record his absence on my own supervision record: it was obvious to me 
that he didn’t want management to know about his ‘timetabling mistake’. Anxious to reassure him 
about something that clearly was important now, I said that of course I would simply be recording 
the current date as the one originally agreed. ‘Thanks for covering for me’ he said, clearly relieved, 
and left the room. 
The fetishization of bureaucracy.  
The above organizational case illustrates how a letter of complaint pointing to a lack within the 
service – a perceived lack of caring – is experienced as a devastating attack by the individual 
concerned, the group and the organization. The PWP’s initial feelings of doubt and shame quickly 
give way to comforting reminders of how service policies and protocols should be sufficient to 
demonstrate care and the group moves to reassure their colleague that, by following these 
directives, she has done all that can be expected in the circumstances. Indeed, the fact that she 
‘can’t care for everyone’ – that there are limits to what such young and inexperienced mental health 
workers can be expected to manage, given their extremely high caseloads  and the nature of the 
short, protocol-based IAPT training they undertake – is not something that appears to be  considered 
at an organizational level. The perceived lack of emotional care raised by the complaint is not 
discussed by management at all, but instead appears to be addressed by recourse to increased 
bureaucracy and surveillance. By pursuing imaginary objectives such as demonstrating 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’, by insisting on compulsory attendance at the group as well as 
access to registers and process notes, management aims to ‘cover’ itself: there is a ‘staging’ of the 
Law as it were, which is invoked as a means of disavowing the lack of care brought to light by the 
patient’s complaint.  
The use of the term ‘cover’ is important in this context, and it is here that the notion of the fetish 
becomes relevant. Lacan (1994) uses metaphors such as the ‘veil’ or ‘curtain’ to refer to the masked 
or disguised qualities of the fetish. Indeed, its ‘fig-leaf’ qualities draw attention to its unconscious 
function in misrepresenting reality. This is taken up by Chasseguet-Smirgel (1971) in her discussion 
of Hans Andersen’s ‘The Nightingale and the Emperor of China’, a story about how the Emperor 
prefers the mechanical tinkling of an artificial bird over the song of the real nightingale. Chasseguet-
Smirgel draws a parallel between the artificial bird in the story and a fetish, noting that in both cases 
admirers are enthralled by what is false. She contrasts the mechanical bird, which is covered with 
glittering jewels, with the more ‘modest’ plumes of the real, living nightingale, pointing out that:  
…the true one does not need to hoodwink anybody or make any display to the world, because it has 
nothing to conceal. At the same time the mechanical nightingale by its radiance will have to try to 
make people forget that it is ‘fabricated’ and only an assemblage of mechanics’ (p. 201).  
I have previously (Rizq, 2012a) taken Hans Andersen’s fairy-tale as rich metaphor for the IAPT 
programme’s fascination with NPM strategies of governance and proceduralism. Like the admirers of 
the mechanical nightingale, managers in the service appeared to be gripped not only by the 
glittering ‘virtual reality’ displayed in the activity data required by the service but more generally by 
the possibility of measuring, labelling, quantifying and calculating its activities and outcomes. These 
‘technologies of representation’ (Power, 2004, p. 778) are of course part and parcel of a wider 
discourse generated recently by the requirements of what has been called ‘evidence-based practice’ 
in the psychotherapeutic field. As such, it is services that demonstrate models of therapeutic 
practice and systems of care that conform to the demand for comprehensive performance 
monitoring systems demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness that attract continued funding and 
investment by the government. For this reason, I suggest, such systems generate a level of 
excitement and energy that undoubtedly constitutes a fetish, an attractive fabrication serving to 
conceal what is felt to be an unbearable lack within the organization.  
In the case example above, it can be seen that management’s insistence on the marshalling of 
evidence - the directive to make the groups mandatory, to keep attendance registers and to open 
the group’s process to scrutiny by management – was not only an extension of the performance-
monitoring system characteristic of the service, but in fact sponsored further perverse dynamics.  In 
response to the increased surveillance following the letter of complaint, the group reacted by 
idealising their work. Difficulties, problems and complexity were increasingly glossed over, as were 
the feelings of shame, guilt and inadequacy that had initially been expressed. Instead, a ‘glittering’ 
version of the work started to emerge, one in which the very real difficulties in providing sufficient 
care and concern were ignored and replaced with a discourse of excellence, ready-made rules, 
regulations and ‘short-cuts’ all of which seemed to absolve members from any responsibility for 
thinking about what had happened. My supervisee too seemed to become swept up in the 
fabrication that was being constructed, led astray by the perverse dynamics being played out in the 
group in which his own role and function – in fact, to provide care and concern to staff – was 
increasingly diminished and marginalised.   
It was with my own clinical supervisor that I had the opportunity to examine my relationship with my 
supervisee in a little more detail. Somewhat reluctantly, I noticed how I too had been increasingly 
marginalised in the supervision sessions. Just as my supervisee felt redundant in the face of the 
group’s increasingly self-celebratory language (leading him to feel the group could ‘run by itself 
now’), so too I had felt redundant, emotionally removing myself through boredom and sleepiness. I 
realised that I had been losing interest for some time in our work; indeed, in a perverse dynamic akin 
to the one with which I started this paper, perhaps I had been ‘there…..but not really’, unconsciously 
allowing my supervisee to ‘run by himself’: in this sense, it was not surprising that he had ‘forgotten’ 
to come to the session. Indeed, at a wider level, it seems that an unconscious perverse 
organizational dynamic had been percolating through the service, culminating in the missed 
supervision session that indexed and enacted the very lack (of care) within the service that had been 
noticed by the complaining patient. It seemed to me that my colleague had himself disavowed the 
lack of care I had been showing, as well as, perhaps, his own unconscious anger, by refusing to 
discuss his absence in any detail. Instead, he had recruited me as willing accomplice (Long, 2009) 
into ‘covering’ the absence (thereby ensuring that he too was ‘there….but not really’), using the 
service’s ‘rituals of verification’ (Power, 1999) to conceal something felt to be shameful, something 
that could not be spoken or thought about. 
Discussion 
What is it that the fetishization of bureaucracy within mental health services disavows?  Obholzer 
(1993) argues that a national health service is used as an unconscious receptacle for the nation’s 
anxieties about frailty, illness and death, suggesting that, quite apart from its acknowledged, 
normative healthcare aims, the NHS has always performed a symbolic or existential role in society. 
Hinshelwood (1994), too, argues that: ‘Our institutions are set up with the prime purpose of dealing 
with unwanted anxiety’ (p. 42). He goes on to propose that mental health staff are tasked by society 
to carry out ‘anxiety work’ demanding an exceptionally high degree of emotional resilience in those 
who have to cope with the psychological stress of managing ‘madness’, vulnerability and mental 
illness.   
The continuing – and escalating - demand for the care of the mentally ill was, of course, something 
the IAPT programme was explicitly designed to address. As a flagship mental health initiative, it has 
received the highest level of investment by any UK government since the inception of the NHS, 
resulting in a doubling of the annual budget spent on mental health services from 0.3% to 0.6%.  At 
the same time, however, Layton (2009) points out the prevalence of neoliberal philosophies that 
over the last thirty years have sponsored a form of subjectivity within free market cultures 
characterized by omnipotent fantasies of invulnerability and security alongside a repudiation of 
weakness, dependency and a reduced capacity for empathy. She points to the lack of secure 
containing governmental authorities and the failure of governments to offer adequate social 
provision, resulting in a traumatic decline in people’s sense of safety, security and trust.  These 
reactions speak vividly to the UK experience, where there is increasing disavowal of the need for 
social and institutional containers, obvious examples of which include the recent abolition of 
universal child support, the instigation of ‘parent-led’ schools, the demise of final salary pension 
schemes and swingeing cuts to welfare services and benefits. Within public healthcare services too, 
the Coalition Government’s Health and Social Care Bill, introduced into parliament in January 2011, 
points to a political decision to absolve government from the responsibility for service provision in 
favour of service commissioning.  
How might this decline in symbolic authority together with its repudiation of citizens’ dependency 
needs intersect with healthcare policy, organizational structure and the emergence of the above 
perverse dynamics in mental health services?  Fotaki (2010) argues that one of the difficulties in 
understanding the impact of public policy-making is that contemporary theorizing is generally based 
on assumptions of rational reflexivity. She goes on to suggest, from a Lacanian perspective, that 
policy-making expresses not only rational objectives, but also ‘societal fantasies originating in the 
imaginary strivings of the subject’ (p.704).  Applying Fotaki’s arguments to the hugely ambitious 
scale of the IAPT mental health programme, we can view its overtly optimistic agenda to ‘improve 
not only the health and well-being of the population but also promote social inclusion and improve 
economic productivity’ (DoH, 2007, p.4) as more aspirational than achievable. Indeed, Fotaki (2006) 
goes on to argue that policies based on ‘semi-utopian’ ideas must ultimately fail: in reality, of course, 
we ‘can’t care for everybody’.  I want to propose that the government’s response to this unwelcome 
piece of reality is the emergence of what might be termed a perverse solution: one in which it is not 
only implementing a large-scale mental health policy based on improving financial productivity in a 
time of unprecedented global austerity, (thereby ‘turning a blind eye’ to contemporary global socio-
economic realities) but one in which the dependency and psychological suffering of patients, as well 
as the anxieties and limitations of those tasked with caring for them are simultaneously disavowed 
and concealed beneath overwhelming bureaucratic and governance systems.   
I suggest that the construction of this ‘virtual’ system of psychological care constitutes a fetish, a 
fabricated Symbolic father, where attention to targets, activity data, risk assessments and 
measurable clinical outcomes and so on ‘covers’ or substitutes for the failure of government to 
install thoughtful, containing institutions and services. Like the song of the mechanical nightingale, 
the signifiers of care thus become more important, more real - and more attractive - than the actual 
care they signify. In this way, as Hoggett (2010) suggests, ‘welfare governance takes on the form of a 
virtual reality’ (p. 5), perverting the course of therapy and leaving patients feeling ‘utterly uncared 
for’ whilst the organization remains duped by its own illusory competence.  
Indeed, I suspect it was no coincidence that the patient who made the complaint was herself 
struggling to cope with a profoundly disabled child, whose total dependence on her maternal care 
and support was clearly overwhelming, exhausting and draining. As exemplar of the disavowed 
suffering and dependency of patients (recall that this patient was in fact refused counselling and 
referred to another service), I suggest the letter of complaint, which may be seen as part of a 
Symbolic order structured by loss and lack, acted to blow the service’s Imaginary ‘cover’, exposing, 
articulating and driving home the unwelcome reality of the service’s limitations in caring for such 
mentally distressed patients. The fetishization of governance within the organization thus provides a 
managerially-sanctioned route to the disavowal of limitations intrinsic to the care of the mentally ill 
(Cooper and Lousada, 2005) via the staging of ‘evidence’ intended to demonstrate an idealised view 
of the organization’s work.  
Conclusion 
‘Finally’, writes Power (2000), ‘the ‘audit society’ can be understood as a label for a loss of 
confidence in the central steering institutions of society, particularly politics. So it may be that a loss 
of faith in intellectual, political and economic leadership has led to the creation of industries of 
checking which satisfy a demand for signals of order. In the UK auditing and inspection will be set to 
work in the name of ‘best value’ and ‘joined-up’ government, but we may be forced to understand 
auditing as part of a general language of decline which attempts to bridge the widening gulf 
between plans and achievements’ (p. 118).  
Power’s comments above speak to the way in which systems of governance act to ‘prop up’ or 
support failing trust in the Symbolic role of government.  In this paper I have argued that the 
organizational dynamics of perversion demonstrate a complex intersection of health policy, neo-
liberal governmentality and individual subjectivity. Using the example of the UK government’s IAPT 
programme, I have suggested that an emphasis on performance measurement systems in mental 
health services can be used unconsciously to buttress the paternal function of a government that is 
deemed by the public to be increasingly weak and uninterested in welfare provision whilst at the 
same time undermining and subverting the very care these systems are mandated to ensure. 
Theorizing the paradoxical effects of the audit culture in this way expands our understanding beyond 
the more traditional psychoanalytic Kleinian literature on unconscious social defences within 
organizations (Jaques, 1955; Hinshelwood, 1994; Hoggett, 2006; Menzies-Lyth, 1960) by recasting 
NPM strategies of audit, evaluation and performance as fetishistic constructions unconsciously 
designed to mask or conceal a subjective sense of lack and fragmentation sponsored by contact with 
psychological pain and suffering.  
This paper has also attempted to illuminate the ‘tyranny of transparency’ (Strathern, 2000) endemic 
in public sector institutions and points to the detrimental impact of governance, regulation and 
surveillance on clinical practice and supervision in mental health services. Indeed, the Francis Report 
(2010), commissioned by the government to investigate the hundreds of deaths at the Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Hospital during the period 2005-2009, is outspoken about the 
way in which hospital staff reacted to the pressure to meet targets, trenchantly concluding that:  
 ‘People must always come before numbers. Individual patients and their treatment are what really 
matters. Statistics, benchmarks and action plans are tools not ends in themselves. They should not 
come before patients and their experiences. This is what must be remembered by all those who 
design and implement policy for the NHS’ (p. 4). 
Francis’s words are increasingly apposite in the current context of widespread changes to the 
structure of the NHS which now includes, amongst other things, mandatory tendering of services to 
private sector companies, ‘payment by results’ according to national and locally-set mental health 
tariffs and Clinical Commissioning Groups that ensure General Practitioners (GPs) take responsibility 
for the commissioning and purchasing of services in their locality.  I would like to suggest that a 
psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious dynamics of perversion and fetishism may enable 
clinical practitioners, managers, politicians and academics alike to address the practical issues 
identified by the Francis Report more effectively and creatively, thereby permitting greater 
understanding of the likely psychic – and clinical - consequences of operational and strategic 
decision-making within public sector healthcare organizations. As we now move through some of 
the biggest reforms ever seen in the NHS’s history, such understanding is likely to be crucial to 
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